University at Albany, State University of New York

Scholars Archive
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

7-2014

NK≠HPC
NK HPC
P.D. Magnus
University at Albany, State University of New York, pmagnus@albany.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/cas_philosophy_scholar
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
P. D. Magnus "NK≠HPC" The Philosophical Quarterly (July 2014) 64 (256): 471-477 first published online
March 22, 2014 doi:10.1093/pq/pqu010

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.

NK≠HPC	
  
P.D. Magnus
pmagnus<at>fecundity.com
http://www.fecundity.com/job

11jan2014
Author’s final draft. Forthcoming in
The Philosophical Quarterly

Abstract	
  
The Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) account of natural kinds has become popular
since it was proposed by Richard Boyd in the late 1980s. Although it is often taken to
define natural kinds as such, it is easy enough to see that something's being a natural kind
is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. This paper argues that it is better
not to understand HPCs as defining what it is to be a natural kind but instead as providing
the ontological realization of (some) natural kinds.
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It has become common in recent years to think of natural kinds as Homeostatic
Property Clusters (HPCs). An HPC is a structured repetition of properties in the world,
maintained by an underlying causal process. The stock example is a biological species.
Members of a species are characterized by a cluster of typical features. This cluster is
held together in a particular organism by the causal processes in and around its body. It
has recurrent instances in multiple organisms because of the reproductive processes of the
previous generation. And all the generations form the evolutionary lineage of the species.
Both the account and the term HPC are due to Richard Boyd. Nevertheless, there
is no locus classicus. Boyd's account has been given piecemeal, in a series of papers
stretching over twenty-five years (Boyd 1988; 1989; 1991; 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2003a;
2003b; 2010). In most of these essays, he invokes HPCs in order to establish something
else as the essay's central topic. For example, he first introduced HPCs in a discussion of
moral realism (1988). In a recent discussion of natural kinds, he invokes HPCs in one
paragraph and refers readers to four earlier articles for 'further discussions' (2010: 216-7).
A consequence of this is that HPCs as popularly received might be — and I argue are —
different than Boyd's own account of them.
Hilary Kornblith, who was an early adopter, writes, 'Boyd suggests that this
account of self-maintenance in organisms [i.e., homeostasis] may provide a model for all
natural kinds. A natural kind is a cluster of properties which, when realized together in
the same substance, work to maintain and reinforce each other, even in the face of
changes in the environment' (1993: 35). More recently, Richard Samuels and Michael
Ferreira write that 'philosophers of science have, in recent years, reached a consensus —
or as close to consensus as philosophers ever get — according to which natural kinds are
Homeostatic Property Clusters' (2010: 222). Understood in this way, the HPC account
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provides both the taxonomic and ontological ground of natural kinds: It describes what
distinguishes a natural kind from an arbitrary category (natural kinds are HPCs) and
explains what it is in the world that holds natural kinds together (the causal patterns
responsible for homeostasis). Call such an account, according to which the category
natural kind is simply equated with HPC, an NK=HPC account.
This is how the HPC account is typically understood, but it faces an obvious and
fatal difficulty. Fundamental particles do not seem to have their properties occur together
in anything like the way species do. For example, the mass of the electron is a precise and
unfailing feature of electrons rather than merely one that is typical of electrons. The value
for the mass is simply a parameter in the standard model — a basic feature of the
universe — rather than being maintained by an underlying pattern of causes. So
fundamental particles do not constitute HPCs. But it would be absurd to say that electron
did not count as a natural kind. So not all natural kinds are HPCs.1
This should not be taken as a reason to abandon HPCs, I argue, but instead to
abandon the simplistic formula of NK=HPC accounts. To make the alternative clear, we
need to distinguish two questions about natural kinds: First, what criteria distinguish
natural kinds from arbitrary categories? Second, what features of the world make some
categories but not others satisfy these criteria?
One might be tempted to call these the epistemic and metaphysical conceptions,
respectively, but that would be a mistake. The first question is not how we might test
whether some category is a natural kind. The criteria which distinguish natural kinds need
not be epistemically accessible. Even if they are accessible, access will probably require
checking operationalized proxies instead of the criteria themselves.
The difference between the two questions is instead one of specificity and depth.
The first question is general, because it asks about natural kinds as such. It is also
potentially superficial, because the characterization might be given independently of the
ontology that holds the kind together. Call it the taxonomy question. The second question
specifies what it is that satisfies that characterization. Call it the ontology question.
Independently of thinking about HPCs, it is worth distinguishing the two
questions.
The ontology question can be raised without a general account of naturalness. For
example, if we consider chemical elements to be natural kinds, then we can ask what
unifies an element. This will tell us about elements while remaining mum on whether
other things, like compounds, species, or mental states, might also be natural kinds. It is
not obvious — and I suspect it is false — that natural kinds all have the same underlying
ontology. So we might give one answer to the taxonomy question (by characterizing the
rôle that natural kinds necessarily play in our account of the world) while giving a range
of answers to the ontology question (by explaining the different underlying natures of
different natural kinds). Some natural groups, like chemical elements, are unified because
members of the kind have a similar composition and so behave similarly according to
general, causal laws. Others, like biological species, are unified by sharing a historical
source and so behave similarly because of common cause.

1

Many authors note this kind of counterexample; e.g. Chakravartty (2007), Magnus
(2012), and Slater (forthcoming).
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Katherine Hawley and Alexander Bird (2011) distinguish the two questions,
calling them the 'naturalness' and 'kindhood' questions respectively. They focus primarily
on ontology and argue that every natural kind is a complex universal, mereologically
composed of simple universals. Yet, without an account of taxonomy, it remains an open
possibility that many complex universals will not correspond to any natural kind. If
unrestricted mereological realism is correct, then Hawley and Bird's complex universals
would obviously outnumber natural kinds.
Nevertheless, many contemporary authors either conflate the two questions or
suppose that one account must be given to answer both. If natural kinds all have essences
in some thick sense, then that gives a general answer to the ontology question. If there is
a natural kind corresponding to every essence, then this also answers the taxonomy
question. So essentialism suggests that the two questions are two sides of the same coin.2
An NK=HPC account also collapses the two questions. This parallel might
explain why many philosophers have seen the HPC approach, when applied to cases, as
just a variant of essentialism.3 Paul Griffiths writes, 'In my reading of Boyd, this causal
homeostatic mechanism corresponds to the traditional "essence" of a natural kind. In the
paradigmatic example of chemical elements, the causal homeostatic mechanism is a
shared microstructure' (1999: 218). The willingness to include chemical elements
suggests that Griffiths means this in a universal way, so as to say that there is an HPC
corresponding to every natural kind. Yet, as we saw above, there is some level at which
the micro-constituents of things must be what they are without an underlying causal
mechanism. Even if elements are understood in terms of the homeostatic structure of
atomic nuclei, electrons and quarks resist such analysis.
Dominic Murphy (2006: 338-41) raises problems in the other direction,
suggesting that some HPCs are not held together by an essence in any interesting sense.
He complains that 'even if species are picked out by a shared history, it is unclear how
something's history can be its essence. … [I]f extrinsic forces are permitted to hold a kind
together, then maybe chartered accountants are a natural kind, since they share properties
in virtue of a historical fact — they passed the relevant exams. But now we start to
wonder whether anything can be a natural kind' (2006: 340). Even if we embrace
promiscuous realism and accept that chartered accountants are a natural kind, we could
construct some counterexample. The minimal characterization of an HPC as a cluster of
properties held together by causes allows for trivial and obscure ones, and it would be a
mistake to count them all as natural kinds. If it becomes the case (as Murphy worries)
that every category can be a natural kind, then we have no need for a conception of
natural kinds at all.
This shows that there is something wrong with NK=HPC accounts. If HPCs
provide an answer to the ontology question, we need a separate answer to the taxonomy
question. There must be some way of understanding natural kinds which is more general,
which can include both fundamental particles, biological species, and whatever else there
might be.
2

This presumes that essences are a one-to-one match for natural kinds.
A critic of the HPC account of species, Richard Richards treats it as kind of essentialism
and thus at odds with the fact that species are historical (2010: 154-8) — despite the fact
that Boyd and others are adamant that an HPC can change over time.
3
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Perhaps surprisingly, such an understanding is already offered by Boyd. Although
he offers his account as 'an alternative approach to the problem of essentialism' (Boyd
1999a: 146), it is a mistake to see it as a variant of essentialism. Boyd suggests that
natural kinds are categories used in scientific accounts which accommodate the structure
of the world. They figure in successful inductive and explanatory practice. He writes,
'The naturalness of natural kinds consists in their aptness for induction and explanation'
(1999a: 147).4 Some of these categories will be causally unified property clusters, he
writes, making HPCs not the whole of natural kinds but instead 'a class of natural kinds'
(1999a: 141) and 'an important family of natural kinds' (1991: 141). My own approach to
natural kinds is similar: Natural kinds are the categories which are indispensable to
successful science for some domain of enquiry, and many important natural kinds turn
out to be HPCs (Magnus 2012).
Boyd's own account of natural kinds thus gives different answers to the two
questions. It answers the taxonomy question in terms of the conditions for successful
scientific taxonomy. It answers the ontology question, for many kinds, by positing HPCs.
And that is consistent with examples like the kind electron which require different
answers to the ontology question and with trivial HPCs which do not belong in scientific
taxonomies.
This relaxed HPC account can allow for important differences in how causes can
hold a kind together. Some HPCs, like a biological species, are clearly historical.
Members of the kind live and die, beget new members, and so on. Moreover, any
particular individual corresponds to a specific, local HPC.5 Take the example of the
human organism who wrote this paper. The literal homeostatic functions of my body
have kept all the properties typical of me occurring together for decades. On such
grounds, Boyd urges that there really is no strict difference between HPCs and
individuals. He writes that 'by seeing the similarities between the inductive and
explanatory roles played by reference to natural kinds, on the one hand, and by reference
to individuals, on the other, we can see why the distinction between natural kinds and
(natural) individuals is… merely pragmatic' (1999a: 163).
Other natural kinds are not historical in this way but are plausibly HPCs.
Kornblith suggests that water is an HPC constituted by the causal interplay between
hydrogen and oxygen atoms in H2O molecules (1993: 37).6 Admittedly, there are
problems with treating the causal structure of water just in terms of distinct H2O
molecules. Actual water is a dynamic interplay of molecules, but allowing for the
complications of water chemistry just underscores the complex causal processes
involved. So water might still be said to be an HPC.7 Regardless, water is importantly
different than a biological species or an individual. Although any two members of a
4

This phrase, 'naturalness of natural kinds', marks this as an answer to what I have called
the taxonomy question. As I noted above, Hawley and Bird even call it the question of
naturalness.
5
I discuss species and individuals as HPCs at greater length elsewhere. See Magnus
(2011; 2012: ch. 6; 2013).
6
Boyd comments that the formula 'water = H2O' has fundamentally misled philosophers
about the ontology of natural kinds (1999a: 145-6).
7
See Magnus (2012: 184-190).
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species must share an historical connection — as must any two moments in the life of this
author — bodies of water on different planets might form independently of one another.
So we should distinguish two sorts of HPCs. First, there are those such that every
member of the kind shares a common origin. The properties of the members are due to
that connection, and the kind altogether can be seen as an individual constituted by that
history. Second, there are those which lack such a history. Members might occur
anywhere or at anytime, provided they are put together in the right way. Elsewhere
(Magnus 2012), I have suggested that the former be called token-HPCs (because each
member of the kind belongs to part of the same token history) and that the latter be called
type-HPCs (because each member of the kind is held together by independent causes of
the same type).
Finally, notice that HPCs construed in this way are not elements of fundamental
ontology. An HPC account of natural kinds answers the ontology question in terms of
clustered properties and causal regularities, but it need not say anything much about the
metaphysics of properties and causes. It is consistent with saying that properties and
causes are fundamental ontological categories, with reducing them to other categories, or
with silence about matters of further metaphysics.8
So the best understanding of HPCs withdraws from NK=HPC in several respects:
HPCs provide an answer only to the ontology question about natural kinds — viz., the
question of what it is in the world that holds natural kinds together. It turns out that many
important natural kinds, although not all of them, are HPCs. This is only a partial answer
to the ontology question both because some natural kinds are not HPCs and also because
HPCs need not be taken as metaphysically fundamental. That something is a natural kind
is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being an HPC. Moreover, HPCs are not a
uniform lot. There is an important difference between those which involve a single,
shared causal history (token-HPCs) and those which do not (type-HPCs). What makes
these all count as natural kinds is an independent answer to the taxonomy question.
P.D. Magnus
University at Albany, State University of New York, USA
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